Development of Legal Profession in India

The legal profession in India evolved from an unregulated system of agents and vakils under colonial rule to a unified, self-regulating profession governed by the Advocates Act, 1961. The profession is now organised under a single designation: "Advocate."

Legal Framework

Pre-Independence Evolution

Mayor's Courts (1726): In 1726 a Crown Charter set up Mayor's Courts in the Presidency Towns of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay. Their procedure followed English law, but the people who practised there had no formal legal training. A second Charter of 1753 also made no provision for legal training, and the profession stayed unorganised (R. Jim v Secretary, Bar Council of Tamil Nadu and Puducherry, Madras HC 2025, para 32).

Supreme Court at Calcutta (1774): The Regulating Act 1773 empowered the Crown to set up a Supreme Court, and the Charter of 1774 set it up at Calcutta. Clause II of the Charter let the Court approve and enrol advocates and attorneys, and only they could appear before it. "Advocate" then meant a British or Irish barrister called by one of the Inns; "attorney" meant a solicitor. Indian practitioners were not given audience (R. Jim, para 33).

Vakils and pleaders in the Company's courts (1793 to 1865):

• Bengal Regulation VII of 1793 (made 1 May 1793) was the first regulation on pleaders: "A Regulation for the appointment of Vakils or native Pleaders in the Courts of Civil Judicature in the Provinces of Bengal, Behar and Orissa". Its preamble said that pleading should be "made a distinct profession" open only to men of character and education (In re Regina Guha, Calcutta HC 1916).
• Regulation XXVII of 1814 confined the office of pleader to Hindus and Muslims. Act I of 1846 (7 January 1846), S.4, opened the office of pleader in the Company's courts "to all persons of whatever nation or religion" (Regina Guha). It also let barristers plead in the Sadar Diwani Adalat (R. Jim, para 34).
• Pleaders Act, 1865 (Act XX of 1865), S.4, required each High Court to make rules for the qualification, admission and enrolment of pleaders and mukhtars (Regina Guha).

High Courts and the barrister monopoly (1861 onwards): The Indian High Courts Act 1861 empowered the Crown to set up High Courts in the Presidency Towns (R. Jim, para 35). The Chartered High Courts enrolled advocates under their Letters Patent; other High Courts enrolled them under S.41 of the Legal Practitioners Act 1879 (Bar Council of U.P. v State of U.P., 1972). On the Original Sides of the Calcutta and Bombay High Courts, British barristers held a monopoly. The Law Commission later recorded that the demand for an All-India Bar "arose initially as a protest against the monopoly of the British barristers on the Original Sides of Calcutta and Bombay High Courts and the invidious distinctions between barristers and non-barristers" (14th Report, 1958, Ch 26 para 9).

Why: Colonial courts applied English procedure, so audience in the Crown's courts went first to English-trained barristers, while Indian vakils and pleaders grew up in the Company's courts.

Illustration (not a historical record): before 1961, a merchant suing on the Original Side of the Bombay High Court had to brief a barrister (with an attorney to act), while an Indian vakil could appear only on the Appellate Side. Two lawyers in the same building had different rights of audience because of where they qualified, not how well they argued.

Legal Practitioners Act, 1879 (passed 29 October 1879): the first legislation dealing directly with legal practitioners; until then the courts admitted and regulated lawyers themselves. "Legal practitioner" covered advocates, vakils, attorneys of High Courts, pleaders, mukhtars and revenue agents. S.5 let a person enrolled in a High Court practise in all courts subordinate to it; S.6 let the High Court make rules on suspension and dismissal of pleaders and mukhtars; SS.12 to 14 gave the power to suspend or dismiss and the procedure for inquiry (R. Jim, paras 35 and 36). It repealed the Pleaders Act 1865 (Regina Guha).

Why: The multiplicity of courts (Crown courts, Company courts, revenue courts) required distinct categories of practitioners with jurisdiction-specific rights.

How this worked in practice: a land revenue dispute in a district town went before a Revenue Court, where a revenue agent could appear. An appeal to the District Court needed a pleader, and the High Court needed a vakil or advocate; on the Original Side of a Presidency Town High Court, a barrister. The profession was fragmented by forum, not by competence.

Indian Bar Committee (Chamier Committee), 1923: formed when practitioners demanded Bar Councils; it recommended a Bar Council for each High Court (R. Jim, para 37). Its members were "sharply divided" on the dual system in Calcutta and Bombay and made no recommendation on it (Law Commission 14th Report, Ch 26 para 18).

Indian Bar Councils Act, 1926 (Act XXXVIII of 1926): set up a Bar Council for each High Court and let it inquire into complaints of misconduct. Its role was only advisory: the power to reprimand, suspend or remove an advocate stayed with the High Court under S.10 (R. Jim, para 37). S.8 provided for the High Court's roll of advocates and S.14 for the right to practise (Bar Council of U.P., 1972). S.9(4) let the Calcutta and Bombay High Courts keep the dual system (Law Commission, Ch 26 para 18).

Why: Nationalist sentiment demanded self-governance of the profession, but full unification was politically premature under colonial rule.

Post-Independence Reform

All India Bar Committee (constituted 1951, report 30 March 1953):

• On 12 April 1951 a private member, Syed Mohammed Ahmad Kazmi, introduced a comprehensive Bill to amend the Indian Bar Councils Act. In August 1951 the Law Minister announced a Committee of Inquiry into a unified Bar, the dual system, the different classes of practitioners and Bar Councils for India and each State (BCI official history page; Law Commission 14th Report, Ch 26 para 9).
• The All India Bar Committee was chaired by Justice S.R. Das, a Judge of the Supreme Court (BCI history; R. Jim, para 38). The Law Commission calls it "the All-India Bar Committee of 1951" (Ch 26 para 18).
• It submitted its report on 30 March 1953 (BCI history). The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Advocates Act refers to "the recommendations of the All-India Bar Committee made in 1953", and Bar Council of U.P. (1972) and Bonnie Foi (2023) say the same.

So "1951" is when the committee was set up and "1953" is when it reported; both dates are right for different events. The Law Commission's own Report is inconsistent (Ch 25 para 1 says "All India Bar Committee of 1953"), so in an answer write "set up in 1951, reported in 1953".

Its recommendations (R. Jim, para 38; Law Commission, Ch 26 para 9):

1. An All-India Bar Council and a Bar Council for each State
2. A unified Bar with a common roll of advocates entitled to practise in all courts in the country
3. The power of enrolment, suspension and removal of advocates to vest in the Bar Councils

Law Commission, 14th Report (1958), "Reform of Judicial Administration", Ch 26 "The Bar": endorsed the Committee's recommendations and regretted that proposals "made as far back as March 1953" had not been given legislative effect (para 9). R. Jim (para 38) notes that the Law Commission made similar recommendations.

These recommendations were implemented through the Advocates Act, 1961. Its Statement of Objects and Reasons says the Bill implements "the recommendations of the All-India Bar Committee made in 1953, after taking into account the recommendations of the Law Commission" on the Bar and legal education.

Changes after Independence

Main features of the Advocates Act, 1961 (Statement of Objects and Reasons, para 2):

1. An All-India Bar Council and a common roll of advocates, with an advocate on the common roll having a right to practise in any part of the country and in any court, including the Supreme Court
2. Integration of the Bar into a single class of legal practitioners known as advocates
3. A uniform qualification for the admission of persons to be advocates
4. Division of advocates into senior advocates and other advocates based on merit
5. Autonomous Bar Councils, one for the whole of India and one for each State

The Bill also kept the dual system in the Calcutta and Bombay High Courts, leaving those High Courts free to end it (para 3), and repealed the Indian Bar Councils Act 1926 (para 4).

Later changes:

• 1964 and 1973 amendments: the BCI's power of revision (S.48A, Act 21 of 1964); Bar Councils' legal aid and seminar functions (S.6(1)(ee), (eee), S.7(1)(ia) to (ic)), membership of international bodies (S.7A), financial help to State Bar Councils (S.46A), review (S.48AA) and directions (S.48B), all inserted by Act 60 of 1973.
• 1976 and 1993 amendments: S.31 (special provision for attorneys) repealed by Act 107 of 1976 with effect from 1 January 1977; enrolment fee raised and fixed in S.24(1)(f) by Act 70 of 1993 (Rs 600 to the State Bar Council and Rs 150 to the BCI).
• S.30 (right to practise in all courts): not in force in 1988 (Aeltemesh Rein) or in 2002 (Harish Uppal, para 34).
• All India Bar Examination: on 14 December 2009 the Supreme Court was told that the first AIBE would be held in July-August 2010; upheld in Bonnie Foi (2023).
• 2024: Gaurav Kumar v Union of India held that Bar Councils cannot charge more than the enrolment fee in S.24(1)(f); Bar of Indian Lawyers v D.K. Gandhi held that advocates' services are outside the Consumer Protection Act 2019.
• Senior designation: Jitender @ Kalla (2025) moved the Supreme Court's senior designation process to a Full Court decision (see PETH-1.2).

Key Milestones Under the Advocates Act

Correction: the earlier note said S.30 was notified in 1973. That is wrong. Aeltemesh Rein (1988) and Harish Uppal (2002) both record that S.30 was not in force. The date on which S.30 was finally brought into force could not be verified and has been left out.

Importance and Role of the Legal Profession

• Part of the administration of justice: "A well-organized system of judicial administration postulates a properly equipped and efficient Bar" (Law Commission 14th Report, Ch 26 para 1). A lawyer "is as much a part of the administration of Justice as any other office holder" (R. Jim, para 31).
• Officer of the court: the BCI Rules' preamble requires an advocate to act as befits "an officer of the court" (see PETH-2.4). An advocate owes duties to the court and the opposite side as well as the client (D.K. Gandhi, 2024, para 29).
• Guardian of rights and access to justice: the right of an accused to be defended (Art. 22(1)), free legal aid (Art. 39A; Hussainara Khatoon, 1979; Suk Das, 1986) and the duty to defend unpopular accused (A.S. Mohammed Rafi, 2010) depend on a working Bar (see PETH-2.3).
• Self-regulation: Bar Councils enrol advocates, lay down standards and discipline members (S.6, S.7, S.35), keeping the profession independent of the executive (see PETH-1.2).
• Law reform and legal education: promoting law reform is a statutory function of both Bar Councils (S.6(1)(e), S.7(1)(e)), and the BCI sets standards of legal education (S.7(1)(h)).
• Public life: the Law Commission quoted Chief Justice Vanderbilt's five functions of a lawyer: "counselling, advocacy, improving his profession, the courts and the law, leadership in moulding public opinion and the unselfish holding of public office" (Ch 26 para 59), and saw a unified Bar as "a powerful influence for welding the country together" (para 60).

Nature of the Profession

• Law is no trade, briefs no merchandise (Bar Council of Maharashtra v M.V. Dabholkar, 1975). Touting and commercial competition corrupt a profession that holds a statutory monopoly.
• "Legal profession is not a trade or business. It is a noble profession" (Shambhu Ram Yadav v Hanuman Das Khatry, 2001).
• "It is not commercial in nature but is essentially a service oriented, noble profession" (Bar of Indian Lawyers v D.K. Gandhi, 2024, para 29).
• Sui generis: "The Legal Profession is sui generis i.e. unique in nature and cannot be compared with any other Profession" (Bar of Indian Lawyers v D.K. Gandhi, 2024 INSC 410, para 42). Advocates are expected to act with uberrima fides (utmost good faith) towards their clients (para 29).
• Rules that keep it a profession, not a trade: no contingency fee (Rule 20), no advertising or solicitation (Rule 36), no business or full-time salaried employment while practising (Section VII), no sharing of fees with non-advocates (Part VI Ch III Rule 2), and a duty of legal aid (Rule 46).
• Because the profession is a public utility with a monopoly, it carries duties to the court, the client, the opponent, colleagues and society.

Critique: the Law Commission found a fall in standards at the Bar (Ch 26 para 2) and warned that "Standards of professional honour and integrity have tended to be increasingly forgotten in the intense struggle for the earning of a bare living" (para 6). Touting has been a problem since the 1879 Act (para 52). More recently, Bar Councils themselves charged enrolment fees far above the statute until Gaurav Kumar (2024) stopped it. The "noble profession" label is therefore an ideal the profession must keep earning, not a description of every practitioner.

Answer Plan (16 marks)

1. Introduction: from vakils and agents to a single class of advocates (S.29).
2. Pre-independence stages: Mayor's Courts (1726); Supreme Court at Calcutta (1774); Regulation VII of 1793; Act I of 1846; High Courts (1861) and the barrister monopoly; Pleaders Act 1865; Legal Practitioners Act 1879; Chamier Committee 1923; Indian Bar Councils Act 1926.
3. Post-independence: All India Bar Committee (set up 1951 under Justice S.R. Das, reported 30 March 1953); Law Commission 14th Report (1958); Advocates Act 1961 and its five main features.
4. Later changes: 1964, 1973, 1976 and 1993 amendments; S.30 history (Aeltemesh Rein, Harish Uppal); AIBE (2010) and Bonnie Foi (2023); Gaurav Kumar and D.K. Gandhi (2024).
5. Nature of the profession: law is no trade, briefs no merchandise (Dabholkar); noble profession (Shambhu Ram Yadav); sui generis (D.K. Gandhi).
6. Conclusion: self-regulation, with courts controlling audience (Harish Uppal, para 34).

Answer Plan (6 marks): Importance of the Legal Profession

1. Part of the administration of justice (Law Commission Ch 26 para 1; R. Jim, para 31).
2. Officer of the court; duties to court, client and opponent (BCI preamble; D.K. Gandhi).
3. Access to justice and legal aid (Art. 22(1), Art. 39A; Hussainara, Suk Das).
4. Self-regulation and law reform (S.6, S.7).
5. Noble, not a trade (Dabholkar; Shambhu Ram Yadav), with the Law Commission's warning on falling standards.

Recall Check

1. What did Clause II of the 1774 Charter allow, and who was denied audience?
2. Name the committee whose recommendations led to the Advocates Act, 1961, its chairman, the year it was set up and the date of its report.
3. Was S.30 in force in 1988 and in 2002? Which cases tell you?
4. Which case first required pre-enrolment training to be struck down, and which case overruled it?
5. List the five main features of the Advocates Act given in its Statement of Objects and Reasons.

Key Cases

Bar Council of India v Bonnie Foi Law College, 2023 INSC 116 (Constitution Bench) BCI v Bonnie Foi Law College 2023
Issue: Can the BCI prescribe an examination (AIBE) as a condition of practice?
Held: Yes. S.49 read with S.24(3)(d) gives the power, and the BCI may choose whether to hold it before or after enrolment. V. Sudeer (1999) does not lay down the correct law.

V. Sudeer v Bar Council of India (1999) 3 SCC 176 V Sudeer v Bar Council of India 1999
Issue: Could the BCI impose pre-enrolment training by rules? Held (now overruled): The BCI Training Rules 1995 were beyond the BCI's rule-making power. Cite only as history.

Bar Council of Maharashtra v M.V. Dabholkar AIR 1976 SC 242 Bar Council of Maharashtra v MV Dabholkar 1975
Rule: Law is no trade, briefs no merchandise. Canons of conduct are felt by the collective conscience of the profession.

Aeltemesh Rein v Union of India AIR 1988 SC 1768 Aeltemesh Rein v Union of India 1988
Held: The Court would not order S.30 into force, but directed the Government to consider it within six months.

Bar Council of U.P. v State of U.P. AIR 1973 SC 231 Bar Council of UP v State of UP 1973 History used: before 1926, Chartered High Courts enrolled advocates under their Letters Patent and other High Courts under S.41 of the Legal Practitioners Act 1879; the Indian Bar Councils Act 1926 followed; the All India Bar Committee "made recommendations in 1953".

In re Regina Guha (1916) 35 Ind Cas 925 (Calcutta HC) In re Regina Guha 1916 History used: Regulation VII of 1793 was the first regulation on pleaders; Act I of 1846 opened the office to all nations and religions; the Pleaders Act 1865 and the Legal Practitioners Act 1879 followed. Held: a woman could not then be enrolled as a pleader (now only of historical interest).

R. Jim v Secretary, Bar Council of Tamil Nadu and Puducherry (Madras HC, 19 December 2025) R Jim v Secretary Bar Council of Tamil Nadu 2025 History used: paras 32 to 39 trace the profession from the 1726 Charter to the Advocates Act. (Its para 34 says "Bengal Regulation VII of 1773"; the correct year is 1793, as Regina Guha shows.)

Bar of Indian Lawyers v D.K. Gandhi PS National Institute of Communicable Diseases, 2024 INSC 410 Bar of Indian Lawyers v DK Gandhi 2024
Held: The legal profession is sui generis; an advocate's service is under a contract of personal service, so a complaint of deficiency in service against an advocate is not maintainable under the Consumer Protection Act 2019.

Gaurav Kumar v Union of India, 2024 INSC 558 Gaurav Kumar v Union of India 2024
Held: State Bar Councils and the BCI cannot charge more than the enrolment fee and stamp duty in S.24(1)(f) as a pre-condition to enrolment (prospective).

Distinctions

Flashcards