Articles 23 and 24 target specific, historically entrenched forms of human exploitation, human trafficking, forced labour, and child labour in hazardous conditions, each considered so fundamentally inconsistent with human dignity that the Constitution addresses them directly and specifically, rather than leaving them to be addressed only through the more general equality and liberty provisions.
Legal Framework
| Article | Scope |
|---|---|
| Article 23(1) | Traffic in human beings, begar, and other similar forms of forced labour are prohibited; contravention is an offence punishable by law |
| Article 23(2) | Nothing prevents the State from imposing compulsory service for public purposes, provided it does not discriminate on grounds only of religion, race, caste, or class |
| Article 24 | No child below the age of fourteen years shall be employed to work in any factory, mine, or engaged in any other hazardous employment |
| Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976 | Statutory legislation implementing Article 23's prohibition specifically regarding bonded labour |
Article 23: Prohibition of Human Trafficking and Forced Labour
Article 23(1) prohibits "traffic in human beings," a term encompassing the buying and selling of persons, and "begar," a specific term referring to a form of forced labour without payment, along with "other similar forms of forced labour" more broadly, this residual phrase capturing various coercive labour practices beyond the specifically named begar.
Why Article 23, like Article 17, is deliberately drafted to operate directly against private individuals, not merely the state: Human trafficking and forced labour, historically and in contemporary practice, are predominantly perpetrated by private individuals and organisations (traffickers, exploitative employers, bonded labour systems maintained through private economic and social coercion), rather than through formal state action; confining this prohibition only to state conduct would leave the actual, lived practice of these exploitative practices almost entirely unaddressed by this specific constitutional guarantee, exactly the same underlying concern that shaped Article 17's parallel horizontal application against untouchability.
"Forced labour" interpreted broadly. Courts have interpreted "forced labour" broadly to include not only physically coerced labour, but also labour extracted through economic compulsion, such as situations where a person is compelled to work for less than minimum wage due to economic necessity and lack of genuine alternative, or bonded labour arrangements where a person works to discharge a debt under conditions amounting to a form of servitude.
Why this broad, purposive interpretation was adopted: A narrow reading confined only to physical coercion would leave untouched the equally exploitative, and often more pervasive, economic forms of forced labour, where the compulsion operates through dire economic circumstances and lack of real choice rather than direct physical force; the Court recognised that the underlying evil Article 23 addresses, the extraction of labour without genuine free consent, can operate just as effectively through economic coercion as through physical force.
Peoples Union for Democratic Rights v Union of India (1982): The Supreme Court held that labour provided for remuneration less than the prescribed minimum wage constitutes "forced labour" within Article 23's meaning, since a person's economic desperation, compelling them to accept work at below minimum wage, represents precisely the kind of compulsion this provision addresses, regardless of the absence of direct physical force.
Bandhua Mukti Morcha v Union of India (1984): The Supreme Court addressed the specific practice of bonded labour, reinforcing that such arrangements, where a person's labour is extracted to discharge a debt under conditions of servitude, squarely fall within Article 23's prohibition, and directed specific measures for identification, release, and rehabilitation of bonded labourers, reflecting the state's positive obligation to actively address this practice, not merely to formally prohibit it.
Article 23(2): The Compulsory Public Service Exception. This clause permits the state to impose compulsory service for public purposes (such as certain forms of civic duty or emergency-related service obligations), provided this does not discriminate based solely on religion, race, caste, or class.
Why this exception exists: Certain legitimate public purposes may genuinely require compulsory service obligations (analogous to jury duty or certain civic obligations recognised in various legal systems), and the framers did not intend Article 23's general prohibition on forced labour to prevent the state from imposing such legitimate, non-discriminatory public service requirements.
Article 24: Prohibition of Child Labour in Hazardous Employment
Article 24 prohibits employing any child below fourteen years of age in a factory, mine, or in any other hazardous employment.
Why this specific age threshold and this specific focus on hazardous employment were chosen: The framers recognised childhood as a period requiring protection from work environments posing serious risks to physical safety, health, and development, prioritising this particular protection against the most dangerous categories of child labour, even while broader child labour regulation (beyond specifically hazardous employment) has been addressed through subsequent legislative development building upon this constitutional foundation.
Illustrations
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Forced labour through economic compulsion: A group of agricultural workers, due to extreme poverty and lack of alternative employment, are compelled to work for wages substantially below the prescribed minimum wage, with no genuine ability to negotiate or seek alternative work. Applying the Peoples Union for Democratic Rights principle, this arrangement constitutes forced labour within Article 23's meaning, regardless of the absence of direct physical coercion.
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Bonded labour, Article 23 applied: A person, having borrowed a sum of money from a landlord, is required to work on the landlord's land indefinitely to notionally discharge this debt, under conditions preventing them from leaving or seeking other work, with the debt itself structured in a manner that makes genuine repayment practically impossible. This arrangement squarely constitutes bonded labour prohibited under Article 23, applying the Bandhua Mukti Morcha principle, entitling the person to release and rehabilitation.
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Article 24 applied: A twelve-year-old child is employed to work in a mine, an occupation expressly falling within Article 24's prohibited categories given both the child's age (below fourteen) and the hazardous nature of mining work. This employment is constitutionally prohibited, and the employer's conduct in engaging this child labour would attract legal consequences under the implementing statutory framework addressing child labour.
Recall Check
- Why does Article 23, like Article 17, operate directly against private individuals rather than only the state?
- Why have courts interpreted "forced labour" under Article 23 broadly to include labour extracted through economic compulsion, not merely direct physical coercion?
- Why does Article 24 specifically target employment in factories, mines, and other hazardous employment for children below fourteen?
Key Cases
Peoples Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India (1982) Peoples-Union-for-Democratic-Rights-v-Union-of-India-1982 Issue: Whether labour provided for remuneration below the prescribed minimum wage constitutes "forced labour" within Article 23's meaning. Rule: Labour extracted through economic compulsion, including acceptance of below-minimum-wage work due to economic desperation, constitutes forced labour under Article 23, not merely physically coerced labour. Held: The Supreme Court adopted this broad, purposive interpretation, significantly expanding Article 23's practical protective reach.
Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India (1984) Bandhua-Mukti-Morcha-v-Union-of-India-1984 Issue: The scope of the state's obligation to address bonded labour practices under Article 23. Rule: Bonded labour, where labour is extracted to discharge a debt under conditions of servitude, falls within Article 23's prohibition, and the state has a positive obligation to actively identify, release, and rehabilitate bonded labourers. Held: The Supreme Court directed specific measures reflecting this positive obligation, reinforcing that Article 23's prohibition demands active state enforcement, not merely formal legal prohibition.
Distinctions
| Basis | Article 23 (Forced Labour and Trafficking) | Article 24 (Child Labour) |
|---|---|---|
| Persons protected | All persons generally | Specifically children below fourteen years |
| Scope | Traffic in human beings, begar, and other forced labour forms | Employment in factories, mines, or hazardous employment |
| Application against private individuals | Yes, directly | Yes, directly (against employers) |
Flashcards
Q: What does Article 23(1) prohibit? A: Traffic in human beings, begar, and other similar forms of forced labour.
Q: Does Article 23 apply only against the state, or also against private individuals? A: It applies directly against private individuals as well, similar to Article 17.
Q: What did Peoples Union for Democratic Rights v Union of India establish about below-minimum-wage labour? A: It constitutes "forced labour" under Article 23, since economic compulsion is a form of coercion this provision addresses.
Q: What age threshold does Article 24 set for prohibiting employment in hazardous work? A: Below fourteen years.
Q: What exception does Article 23(2) permit regarding compulsory service? A: Compulsory service for public purposes, provided it does not discriminate solely on grounds of religion, race, caste, or class.
Exam Scenario
A brick kiln owner requires workers, who had earlier taken a small loan from him, to work exclusively at his kiln without wages until the loan is repaid, with the terms structured such that the workers can never realistically earn enough credit against the loan to actually discharge it and leave. Separately, the same kiln employs a thirteen-year-old child in kiln operations, a recognised hazardous occupation. Assess the constitutional violations present in this scenario.
Approach: Apply Article 23 and the Bandhua Mukti Morcha principle to identify the loan-based labour arrangement as bonded labour, since the structurally impossible repayment terms mean the workers are, in substance, being compelled into indefinite forced labour to discharge a debt under conditions of servitude, squarely prohibited under Article 23 regardless of any nominal "voluntary" agreement to the loan terms initially. Separately apply Article 24 to the child employment, noting that kiln work is widely recognised as hazardous, and the child's age (thirteen, below the fourteen-year threshold) places this employment squarely within Article 24's express prohibition. Conclude that both the bonded labour arrangement and the child labour employment constitute independent, serious constitutional violations, each attracting the specific remedial and enforcement mechanisms (including the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976, and applicable child labour legislation) developed to give these constitutional prohibitions practical effect.
See Also
- Article 17 Abolition of Untouchability and Article 18 Abolition of Titles : the parallel horizontal application against private individuals, sharing Article 23's underlying structural approach to addressing deeply entrenched social and economic exploitation.