Administrative Law
Subjects / Administrative Law / Separation of Powers: India, UK, USA
Unit 2 · Rule of Law & Separation of Powers

Separation of Powers: India, UK, USA

Separation of powers is the principle that the legislative, executive, and judicial functions of government should be distributed among distinct organs so that no single organ holds all three.

Separation of powers is the principle that the legislative, executive, and judicial functions of government should be distributed among distinct organs so that no single organ holds all three. The object is to prevent concentration of power and to create a system of checks and balances.

Legal Framework

Provision Relevance
Art. 50, Constitution of India Directive: separation of judiciary from executive in public services
Art. 122, Constitution of India Parliamentary proceedings not subject to court scrutiny
Art. 212, Constitution of India State legislature proceedings not subject to court scrutiny
Art. 121, Constitution of India Restrictions on parliamentary discussion of judicial conduct
Art. 124, Constitution of India Establishment and constitution of Supreme Court

The Doctrine: Montesquieu

Charles de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws (1748): tyranny results when the same person or body holds legislative, executive, and judicial power simultaneously. The solution is structural separation. Each function assigned to a separate organ; each organ checks the others.

Why: Montesquieu was writing about the French monarchy. His concern was unchecked royal power. The doctrine he formulated became the blueprint for the American constitution and influenced every liberal democratic constitution thereafter.

Position in USA: Rigid Separation

The US Constitution (1787) adopts the strictest form of separation:

Organ Constitutional basis Function
Legislature Art. I: Congress (Senate and House of Representatives) Makes law
Executive Art. II: President Executes law; no legislative role
Judiciary Art. III: Supreme Court and inferior courts Interprets law; no legislative or executive role

Key features: Each organ is elected or appointed separately. No member of Congress can simultaneously hold executive office. The President cannot dissolve Congress. The Supreme Court can strike down both Congressional legislation (Marbury v Madison, 1803) and executive action as unconstitutional.

Why: The American framers feared both monarchy and legislative tyranny (experienced under the British Parliament). Rigid separation with checks and balances was their structural answer.

Position in UK: Fusion, Not Separation

The UK does not follow separation of powers in the Montesquieu sense. It practises fusion of powers at the executive-legislative interface:

Feature UK Position
Cabinet and Parliament Cabinet ministers are members of Parliament: executive IS embedded in the legislature
Lord Chancellor Historically held all three roles: Cabinet minister (executive), head of judiciary, Speaker of the House of Lords; now reformed by Constitutional Reform Act 2005
Judicial independence House of Lords acted as final court until 2009; replaced by the Supreme Court of the UK under the Constitutional Reform Act 2005
Parliamentary sovereignty Parliament can make or unmake any law; no court can strike it down on constitutional grounds

Why: The UK constitution evolved organically over centuries. Parliamentary sovereignty, not separation of powers, is the foundational principle. Accountability runs through Parliament, not through structural separation.

Position in India: Functional Separation, Not Rigid

India does not adopt rigid separation. The Constitution distributes functions but deliberately creates overlaps:

Feature Indian Position
Cabinet in Parliament Executive (Council of Ministers) is drawn from and collectively responsible to the legislature (Art. 75)
Judicial review Courts review both legislation (Art. 13) and executive action (Arts. 32, 226): judiciary checks both other organs
Delegated legislation Legislature delegates rule-making to the executive: executive exercises legislative function
Administrative tribunals Executive bodies exercise judicial functions (quasi-judicial): subject to superintendence of High Courts
Art. 50 Directive to separate judiciary from executive in public services (not fully implemented)

Why: India adopted parliamentary democracy following the Westminster model. Strict separation was incompatible with cabinet government. But the judiciary is fully independent and exercises substantive review of both the legislature and executive.

Key Cases

Ram Jawaya Kapur v State of Punjab (1955) Ram-Jawaya-Kapur-v-State-of-Punjab-1955 Issue: Whether the executive can exercise functions not expressly conferred by statute or constitutional provision. Rule: The Indian Constitution does not embody the strict doctrine of separation of powers but does differentiate between legislative, executive, and judicial functions. Held: The executive can take any action not prohibited by law or the Constitution; it does not need specific statutory authority for every act, but cannot usurp legislative or judicial functions.

Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala (1973) Kesavananda-Bharati-v-State-of-Kerala-1973 Issue: Whether Parliament can amend any part of the Constitution including fundamental rights. Rule: Basic structure of the Constitution cannot be amended; separation of powers and judicial review are part of the basic structure. Held: Separation of powers, in the sense of an independent judiciary with power of review, is a non-negotiable element of the constitutional order.

Illustrations

**1.

Why rigid separation fails in India: ** The President of India promulgates ordinances under Art. 123 when Parliament is not in session. This is the executive exercising legislative power. Under rigid US-style separation this would be unconstitutional. In India it is expressly provided; separation is functional, not absolute.

2. Checks working in India: Parliament passes the 99th Constitutional Amendment creating the National Judicial Appointments Commission. The Supreme Court strikes it down (NJAC Case, 2015) as violating judicial independence, which is part of the basic structure. Judiciary checking the legislature: separation at work.

3. UK fusion in action: The Home Secretary (executive) introduces the Immigration Bill in Parliament, steers it through as a minister, and then as part of the Cabinet implements it. The same person occupies the executive and legislative roles simultaneously. No Indian or American official can do this.

Recall Check

  1. What is the foundational concern that the doctrine of separation of powers addresses?
  2. How does India differ from the USA in its approach to separation of powers?
  3. What role does judicial review play in India s version of separation of powers?

Distinctions

Feature USA UK India
Type Rigid separation Fusion of powers Functional separation
Executive in legislature No: strict separation Yes: Cabinet from Parliament Yes: Council of Ministers from Parliament
Parliamentary sovereignty No: Constitution supreme Yes: Parliament supreme No: Constitution supreme; basic structure unamendable
Judicial review of legislation Yes (Marbury v Madison) No Yes (Arts. 13, 32, 226)
Written constitution Yes No Yes
Checks and balances Formal and structural Conventional and political Mix: constitutional + political

Flashcards

Q: Who formulated the doctrine of separation of powers and in which work? A: Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws (1748).

Q: What type of separation does the USA practise? A: Rigid separation: Congress (legislature), President (executive), and Supreme Court (judiciary) are structurally separate with no cross-membership.

Q: Why does the UK not practise separation of powers in the classical sense? A: The Cabinet (executive) is drawn from and responsible to Parliament (legislature); parliamentary sovereignty, not structural separation, is the foundational principle.

Q: What does Ram Jawaya Kapur establish about Indian separation of powers? A: India does not embody the strict doctrine; functions overlap but the Constitution differentiates the three functions and each organ must operate within its domain.

Q: How did Kesavananda Bharati protect separation of powers in India? A: Held it part of the basic structure of the Constitution, placing it beyond the amending power of Parliament.

Q: What is Montesquieu's doctrine of separation of powers? A: Legislative, executive, and judicial functions must be vested in separate organs staffed by different persons. Concentration of two or more functions in one organ leads to tyranny.

Q: Does India follow strict separation of powers? A: No. India follows functional separation with checks and balances. Overlap is permitted (ordinances, tribunals, delegated legislation) but core functions of each organ cannot be transferred to another.

Q: Name three Constitutional provisions showing separation in India. A: Art.50 (separate judiciary from executive), Art.122/212 (court cannot question parliamentary proceedings), Art.121/211 (Parliament cannot discuss judicial conduct except removal).

Q: How is separation of powers part of basic structure? A: Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975): Parliament exercising judicial function (validating its own election) violates basic structure. Each organ has irreducible core function.

Q: How does the US non-delegation doctrine differ from Indian position? A: USA: Congress cannot delegate legislative power without "intelligible principle" stricter standard. India: Delegation permitted if parent Act provides essential legislative policy/framework more flexible.

Q: Give an example of checks and balances in India. A: Executive exercises legislative power (ordinances under Art.123); Legislature exercises judicial power (impeachment under Art.61); Judiciary exercises legislative power (court rules under Art.145).

Exam Scenario

Problem: Parliament enacts a law directing that all pending criminal cases against members of Parliament shall be decided by a special committee of MPs, not by the regular courts. A sitting MP convicted by a sessions court challenges his conviction before the High Court, arguing that the sessions court had no jurisdiction. Examine.

Identify: Whether Parliament can transfer judicial functions to itself.

Rule: Separation of powers in India prohibits Parliament from exercising judicial functions. Judicial power belongs to courts. Kesavananda Bharati: judicial review and separation of powers are part of the basic structure.

Apply: A committee of MPs deciding criminal cases is the legislature exercising judicial power. This is a direct usurpation of judicial function. Parliament cannot confer such jurisdiction on itself by statute; it would violate the basic structure.

Conclusion: The law is unconstitutional. The sessions court had proper jurisdiction. The special committee has none. The High Court should uphold the conviction and strike down the law as violating the basic structure.



Problem: Parliament passes a law empowering the Central Government to "take any measures it deems fit for the welfare of citizens." The government, relying on this provision, closes all opposition-run media outlets citing "national interest." Discuss the separation of powers issues.

Approach:

  1. Excessive delegation? "Any measures it deems fit" provides no legislative policy, no guidelines, no limits. This is abdication of legislative function, not delegation. Parliament has handed over essential legislative function to executive.
  2. Executive exercising legislative power: Closing media outlets is equivalent to creating a censorship law legislative function being performed by executive without any statutory framework.
  3. Judicial function bypassed: Whether media outlets violated law is a judicial question. Executive determines guilt and imposes punishment (closure) without adjudication usurping judicial function.
  4. Indian position (Ram Jawaya Kapur): Functional separation requires each organ to perform its essential function. Legislature must provide policy; executive must implement within limits; judiciary must adjudicate rights.
  5. Basic structure: Freedom of press (Art.19(1)(a)) can be restricted only by "reasonable restrictions" under Art.19(2). Executive cannot substitute its satisfaction for legislative restriction or judicial determination.
  6. Conclusion: The enabling Act is void for excessive delegation (no policy). The closure order is void for violating separation executive performed legislative and judicial functions simultaneously without constitutional authority.

Illustrations (from consolidated notes)

  1. Administrative tribunal exercising judicial function: Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) adjudicates service disputes executive body exercising judicial function. Permissible in India because:
  • (a) Art.323A authorizes it

  • (b) subject to HC judicial review (L. Chandra Kumar)

  • (c) essential judicial function (constitutional court jurisdiction) is preserved.

  1. Ordinance power executive legislating: President promulgates ordinance banning cryptocurrency. This is executive exercising legislative power. Constitutional validity: Art.123 permits it during recess; must be laid before Parliament within 6 weeks of reassembly. If not approved, ceases to operate. Checks exist but if government repeatedly re-promulgates without Parliamentary approval, separation is violated (Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, 2017).

  2. Judicial activism courts legislating? SC directs government to implement Vishaka guidelines on sexual harassment. Critics argue judiciary is legislating. Counter: Court is not creating new rights but enforcing existing Art.14/21 rights. Guidelines operate until legislature acts. This is checks and balances, not usurpation.

  3. USA non-delegation: If Indian Parliament passes "the government may make whatever rules it considers necessary for public welfare" this is uncanalised delegation, invalid for lack of policy/guidelines. In USA, this would violate the non-delegation doctrine entirely. In India, less strict delegation permitted if parent Act provides policy framework.