Kerala High Court1971
All India Reporter 1971 Kerala 261; judgment of 24 June 1970
S.2(ii) of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act 1939 is satisfied by the objective fact that the husband has failed to provide maintenance for two years, and the wife's own conduct in contributing to that failure does not defeat her claim to a decree. The 1939 Act is beneficial legislation for a weaker section and is to be construed accordingly.
muslim-lawdissolution-of-muslim-marriages-actfailure-to-maintainkhulakrishna-iyerbeneficial-construction
Read case brief →Allahabad High Court (Full Bench)1886
(1886) Indian Law Reports 8 Allahabad 149 (Full Bench); judgment of 21 January 1886
Marriage among Muhammadans is a purely civil contract and not a sacrament, and the rights and obligations it creates arise immediately on the contract being made. Non-payment of prompt dower does not bar the husband's suit for restitution of conjugal rights, but because restitution is an equitable relief akin to specific performance the decree is made conditional on payment of prompt dower, and the wife may lawfully refuse cohabitation until prompt dower is paid.
muslim-lawmarriagecivil-contractdowermahrrestitution-of-conjugal-rightsmahmood-j
Read case brief →Patna High Court1991
All India Reporter 1991 Patna 154; judgment of 8 February 1990
A bequest in favour of an heir is invalid unless the other heirs consent after the testator's death. The one third limit is not displaced merely because all the heirs happen to be beneficiaries, since sons and daughters do not take equal shares on intestacy and the rule would otherwise be easy to evade. Consent must be given after death, since before death it is unknown who the heirs will be and in what shares. Consent by some heirs only binds those consenting, and the excess legacy is payable out of their shares. Consent need not be express and may be inferred from conduct.
muslim-lawwillswasiyatbequeathable-thirdbequest-to-heirconsent-of-heirsimplied-consentmulla-article-117
Read case brief →Supreme Court of India2009
(2009) 6 Supreme Court Cases 160; All India Reporter 2010 Supreme Court 211; judgment of 6 March 2009
Delivery of possession under Muslim law may be actual or constructive, and may be made in such manner as the subject of the gift is susceptible of. Handing over the deed of gift coupled with the declaration in the document can suffice, and where the donor himself applies for mutation of the property in the donee's name, constructive possession must be held to have been handed over. The conditions of a valid hiba are that the donor be sane, major and owner, that the thing gifted exist and if divisible be separated, that it be lawful under the Shariat and free of things not gifted, and that it come into the possession of the donee or of his representative or guardian.
muslim-lawgifthibaconstructive-deliverymutationtenanted-propertylimitationarticle-59
Read case brief →Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (on appeal from Calcutta)1894
(1894) Law Reports 22 Indian Appeals 76; Indian Law Reports 22 Calcutta 619
A settlement whose substance and dominating purpose is provision for the settlor's family and descendants, with the charitable object dependent on the failure of the line and therefore illusory or so remote as to be nominal, is a family settlement dressed as a waqf and is void. The charitable gift must be substantial and not illusory.
muslim-lawwaqfwaqf-alal-auladfamily-waqfillusory-charityprivy-councilmussalman-wakf-validating-act-1913legislative-reversal
Read case brief →Kerala High Court1995
AIR 1995 Ker 252
The pre-2001 S.10 of the Indian Divorce Act, requiring a wife to prove adultery coupled with another matrimonial offence while the husband needed adultery alone, was discriminatory and violated Arts.14 and 15.
christian-lawdivorce-act-1869discriminationarticle-14article-15section-10equality
Read case brief →Supreme Court of India1979
All India Reporter 1979 Supreme Court 362; (1979) 2 Supreme Court Cases 316; judgment of 6 October 1978
A settlement or agreement between husband and wife at the time of divorce, even if it purports to be in full and final settlement of all claims, does not bar the wife from claiming maintenance under S.125 CrPC if the amount received is not sufficient to maintain her and she is unable to maintain herself. S.127(3)(b) operates to cancel a maintenance order only where the sum paid under customary or personal law is in substance adequate to serve the purpose of maintenance and prevent destitution.
maintenancesection-125-crpcsection-127-crpcfair-settlementdivorced-womanmehrmuslim-law
Read case brief →Supreme Court of India1971
AIR 1971 SC 2057
The Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts Act, 1951 applies only to PUBLIC religious trusts (s.2(1)); the burden is on the Board to prove public dedication, and a private mutt where the endowment is not intended to benefit the public can lawfully exist. Public user of a shrine, feeding of sadhus, festivals, or the phrase \"appertaining to the asthal\" do not, by themselves, establish that a mutt's property is a public trust.
religious-endowmentbihar-hindu-religious-trusts-actpublic-trustburden-of-proofmutt
Read case brief →Supreme Court of India1955
AIR 1955 SC 36
The common law rule that a wife's domicile automatically follows the husband's does not apply with the same rigidity in India; a married woman may acquire a domicile of her own, particularly where the spouses live apart.
domicilemarried-womanindependent-domiciledependent-domicileconflict-of-laws
Read case brief →Supreme Court of India (five Judge Constitution Bench)2001
(2001) 7 Supreme Court Cases 740; All India Reporter 2001 Supreme Court 3958; judgment of 28 September 2001
The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act 1986 is constitutionally valid but is read down. The obligation of a Muslim husband under S.3(1)(a) is not confined to the iddat period. Reasonable and fair provision and maintenance are distinct: the husband must, within the iddat period, make and pay a reasonable and fair provision for his divorced wife extending beyond the iddat period, in addition to maintenance for the iddat period itself. If she is unable to maintain herself after iddat and has not remarried, recourse lies against her relatives under S.4 and failing them against the State Wakf Board.
muslim-lawmaintenance1986-actiddatreasonable-and-fair-provisionreading-downshah-banoconstitution-bench
Read case brief →Supreme Court of India (five Judge Constitution Bench)1994
(1994) 6 Supreme Court Cases 360; All India Reporter 1995 Supreme Court 605(A); judgment of 24 October 1994
S.4(3) of the Acquisition of Certain Area at Ayodhya Act 1993, which abated all pending suits relating to the disputed area, is unconstitutional and invalid because abating suits without providing an alternative dispute resolution mechanism extinguishes the judicial remedy and negates the rule of law; the provision is severable and the rest of the Act is valid. Irrespective of the status of a mosque under Muslim law in Islamic countries, the status of a mosque under the Mahomedan law applicable in secular India is the same and equal to that of any other place of worship of any religion, and it does not enjoy any greater immunity from acquisition under the sovereign power of the State.
muslim-lawwaqfmosqueacquisitionarticle-25article-26essential-religious-practiceayodhya
Read case brief →Supreme Court of India1980
(1980) 4 Supreme Court Cases 125; All India Reporter 1980 Supreme Court 1730; judgment of 8 May 1980
Payment of mehr does not automatically operate under S.127(3)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure to cancel or discharge an order of maintenance under S.125. S.127(3)(b) is attracted only where the sum paid under customary or personal law is in substance a genuine sum adequate to serve the purpose of maintenance and to prevent destitution, so that it can be said to have been paid on divorce in lieu of maintenance. A conventional or illusory mehr does not qualify.
muslim-lawmaintenancemehrsection-125-crpcsection-127-crpckrishna-iyerdestitutionarticle-141
Read case brief →Supreme Court of India1960
All India Reporter 1960 Supreme Court 93; (1960) 1 Supreme Court Reports 597; judgment of 27 August 1959
Under Muhammadan law the mother of an illegitimate female infant is entitled to its custody, so refusal to restore the child to her amounts to illegal detention. A dispute as to the child's paternity is irrelevant to the application. The existence of an alternative remedy under the Guardians and Wards Act is no justification for refusing relief of the nature of habeas corpus, and the Supreme Court will interfere where the High Court's discretion was not judicially exercised.
muslim-lawcustodyhizanatillegitimate-childmotherhabeas-corpusguardians-and-wards-actwelfare-of-minor
Read case brief →Supreme Court of India2000
(2000) 8 Supreme Court Cases 507; (2001) 1 Maharashtra Law Journal 427; judgment of 19 July 2000
Where the father of a minor is alive, the mother cannot act as, or be appointed, guardian of the minor's property for the purpose of accepting a gift on his behalf, and a gift so accepted is invalid. Valia Peedikakkandi Katheessa Umma applies only where the father and paternal grandfather are not alive, that is, where no guardian of the property is in existence. A High Court cannot find an agency by the husband in the wife's favour where it was neither pleaded nor supported by evidence.
muslim-lawgifthibaminor-doneeguardian-of-propertymotherfather-aliveletters-of-administration
Read case brief →Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (on appeal from Allahabad)1916
(1916) 43 Indian Appeals 294; All India Reporter 1916 Privy Council 46; Indian Law Reports 38 Allahabad 581; judgment of 1 August 1916
Dower is a debt of the husband and the widow is entitled, along with other creditors, to have it satisfied out of his estate on his death, but her right is no greater than that of any other unsecured creditor. As against the heirs she has a creditor's lien, so that where she has lawfully obtained possession of the estate with the express or implied consent of the husband or the heirs she may retain that possession until the dower debt is satisfied.
muslim-lawdowermahrwidows-right-of-retentionunsecured-debtprivy-council
Read case brief →Bombay High Court (Nagpur)1976
All India Reporter 1976 Bombay 23; judgment of 2 December 1974
A gift of an undivided share (musha) in property capable of division is irregular (fasid) and not void (batil), and is perfected and validated by a subsequent partition and delivery to the donee of the share given, or if possession is once taken. Delivery may be effected according to the nature of the property: for tenanted property by the donor requesting the tenants to attorn to the donee, and where donor and donee both reside on the property by some overt act showing a clear intention to transfer possession.
muslim-lawgifthibamushaundivided-shareirregular-giftdelivery-of-possessionattornment
Read case brief →Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (on appeal from Calcutta)1918
(1918) Law Reports 45 Indian Appeals 73; Indian Law Reports 45 Calcutta 878; All India Reporter 1918 Privy Council 11; judgment of 28 February 1918
Under Muhammadan law the mother is entitled only to custody of the person of a minor; she is not the natural guardian and has no greater power over the minor's property than a stranger. The label de facto guardian is misleading. A person having charge of the person or property of a minor without being the legal guardian has no power to convey to another any right or interest in immovable property which the transferee can enforce against the infant, nor can such transferee, if let into possession, resist an action in ejectment on behalf of the infant as a trespasser.
muslim-lawguardianshipde-facto-guardianalienationminors-propertyimmovable-propertyprivy-councilameer-ali
Read case brief →Supreme Court of India2025
2025 INSC 1116; 2025 LiveLaw (Supreme Court) 909; interim order of 15 September 2025
Interim order only. The Court refused to stay the Waqf (Amendment) Act 2025 as a whole, holding that striking down a statute is reserved for the rarest of cases and that the presumption is always in favour of constitutionality, and finding no prima facie case against the 2025 amendment as a whole. It stayed the operation of S.3(r) insofar as it requires the waqif to prove five years of practising Islam, until the States frame guidelines for such determination, and stayed the proviso to S.3C(2), S.3C(3) and S.3C(4) on separation of powers grounds. It capped non Muslim members at four on the Central Waqf Council and three on State Waqf Boards, directed that titles will not be affected and waqfs not dispossessed until final adjudication, directed that a waqf cannot create third party rights pending adjudication, and extended the time to register waqfs.
muslim-lawwaqfwaqf-amendment-act-2025umeed-actinterim-ordersection-3rsection-3cwaqf-by-user
Read case brief →Allahabad High Court1960
All India Reporter 1960 Allahabad 684; 1960 Allahabad Law Journal 523; judgment of 29 August 1959
Muslim law tolerates but does not encourage polygamy, and confers no absolute right on a husband to compel the first wife to share his consortium in all circumstances. A suit for restitution of conjugal rights is enforcement of a right under a civil contract, and the court sits as a mixed court of equity, so relief may be refused where the plaintiff's conduct is unworthy or the suit mala fide. Under modern social conditions the very act of taking a second wife raises a presumption of cruelty to the first, and the onus shifts to the husband to prove that his second marriage involved no insult or cruelty to her.
muslim-lawpolygamycrueltyrestitution-of-conjugal-rightspresumption-of-crueltymixed-court-of-equitysecond-marriage
Read case brief →Allahabad High Court (Full Bench)1885
(1885) Indian Law Reports 7 Allahabad 822 (Full Bench); judgment of 10 February 1885
On the death of a Muslim owner the inheritance vests immediately in the heirs in their specific shares; devolution is not suspended pending payment of debts. Muhammadan heirs are independent owners of their specific shares, and if they take subject to the charge of the debts of the deceased their liability is in proportion to the extent of their shares. A creditor must therefore implead all the heirs against whose shares he seeks to enforce his claim. No valid will can be made in favour of an heir, and even in favour of a stranger a bequest holds good only to the extent of one third of the property remaining after funeral expenses and debts; consent of the heirs validating an excess must be given after the testator's death.
muslim-lawsuccessionheirs-liabilityproportionate-liabilitybequeathable-thirdbequest-to-heirconsent-of-heirsmahmood-j
Read case brief →Supreme Court of India (sitting on a Hyderabad appeal under Art.374(4))1950
1950 Supreme Court Reports 747; All India Reporter 1953 Supreme Court 413; judgment of 12 October 1950
A Muslim widow in possession of her husband's estate in lieu of unpaid dower, whether with the consent of the other heirs or otherwise, is not entitled to priority as against his other unsecured creditors. There is nothing in the nature of dower entitling it to priority. Her lien gives her no priority over other creditors; dower as a debt has priority only over the heirs' claim to have the estate distributed. Possession makes no difference to either proposition.
muslim-lawdowermahrwidows-right-of-retentionunsecured-creditorno-priorityexecution
Read case brief →Supreme Court of Pakistan1967
Pakistan Legal Decisions 1967 Supreme Court 97
Under Muslim law a wife is entitled to khula as of right if she satisfies the court that she would otherwise be forced into a hateful union, even if the husband does not consent and does not pronounce talaq. Where the husband disputes the right, the dispute is for the Qazi, that is the court, to adjudicate. The right is controlled rather than absolute, in that its success depends on the court being satisfied that the spouses cannot live within the limits of God, and it is conditional on the wife restoring or agreeing to restore the dower or other consideration received. Khula is separation and not talaq, so the husband has no right to take the wife back as he would after talaq-i-raja'i.
muslim-lawkhulawife-initiated-divorcepakistanpersuasive-authorityqazidower-restorationcomparative
Read case brief →Supreme Court of India1991
(1991) 3 SCC 554
Prolonged residence in India raises a strong presumption of the intention to remain permanently (animus manendi), but residence alone is not conclusive of domicile; the totality of circumstances must be assessed.
domicileanimusresidenceforeign-nationalprolonged-residencedeportation
Read case brief →Supreme Court of India1995
(1995) 3 Supreme Court Cases 693; All India Reporter 1995 Supreme Court 1205; judgment of 23 March 1995
Although a gift by a Muslim need not be in writing and need not be registered, to be complete there must be a declaration of gift by the donor, acceptance express or implied by or on behalf of the donee, and delivery of possession actual or constructive; where the donor is in possession of immovable property he must completely divest himself physically of the subject of the gift. Under Muhammadan law a mother can neither act as nor be appointed property guardian or legal guardian of her minor child. The operative disposal turned on res judicata between co defendants and on fraud and collusion under S.44 of the Evidence Act.
muslim-lawgifthibathree-essentialsdelivery-of-possessionmother-not-guardianres-judicatafraud
Read case brief →Supreme Court of India1986
AIR 1986 SC 1011
The Indian Succession Act 1925 applies uniformly to all Indian Christians, displacing the Travancore Christian Succession Act 1916; daughters inherit equally with sons.
christian-lawsuccessionindian-succession-actequalitytravancoredaughters-share
Read case brief →Delhi High Court2007
2008 (103) Delhi Reported Judgments 137; Indian Law Reports (2007) II Delhi 1329; 2007 SCC OnLine Delhi 1357; judgment of 3 October 2007
A triple talaq, talaq-e-biddat, even among Sunni Muslims, is to be regarded as one revocable talaq, so that the iddat period remains available for reflection, revocation and reconciliation. A talaq pronounced in extreme anger, where the husband has lost control of himself, is not effective. Communication to the wife is an essential element of pronouncement, and talaq takes effect on the date of communication; if never communicated it does not take effect at all. Where the talaq is irrevocable the reconciliation attempt must precede pronouncement, but where it is revocable the attempt may come before or after pronouncement provided it is before the end of iddat.
muslim-lawtriple-talaqrevocable-talaqcommunicationangeriddatreconciliationdelhi-high-court
Read case brief →Gauhati High Court1984
All India Reporter 1984 Gauhati 41; judgment of 12 May 1983
S.129 of the Transfer of Property Act takes Muslim gifts out of Chapter VII including S.123, so the requirement of a registered instrument does not apply. The three essentials of a valid gift are declaration, acceptance and delivery of possession, actual or constructive, and no written document is required. Where a writing merely records the declaration rather than constituting the gift, S.17 of the Registration Act does not require it to be registered; the facts of each case determine whether the writing is a formal instrument creating the gift or a mere record of it.
muslim-lawgifthibawriting-not-requiredregistrationsection-129-tpasection-17-registration-actsubstance-over-form
Read case brief →Supreme Court of India2019
(2019) 4 Supreme Court Cases 130; judgment of 22 January 2019
A marriage between a Muslim man and a Hindu woman is neither valid nor void but irregular (fasid) under Muhammadan law. An irregular marriage subsists until terminated in accordance with law, so the child born of such a marriage is legitimate exactly as the child of a valid marriage is, and is entitled to claim a share in the father's property. The wife in such a marriage is entitled to her dower but does not inherit from the husband.
muslim-lawirregular-marriagefasidbatillegitimacyinheritanceinterfaith-marriage
Read case brief →Supreme Court of India2024
2024 INSC 506; 2024 SCC OnLine Supreme Court 1686; Criminal Appeal No 2842 of 2024; judgment of 10 July 2024
S.125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, now S.144 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita 2023, applies to all married and divorced women irrespective of their personal law, including Muslim women divorced by pronouncement of triple talaq. The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act 1986 is not a special law overriding the general provision; the remedy under the 1986 Act is in addition to and not in derogation of the criminal maintenance remedy, and a divorced Muslim woman may pursue both.
muslim-lawmaintenancesection-125-crpcsection-144-bnss1986-actsecular-remedycumulative-remediesnagarathna
Read case brief →Supreme Court of India1996
(1996) 6 SCC 337
The Divorce Act provides exclusive jurisdiction over nullity of marriage to District and High Courts, and Ecclesiastical Tribunal orders are not binding.
christian-lawindian-divorce-actnullityecclesiastical-tribunalsexclusive-jurisdiction
Read case brief →Judicial Committee of the Privy Council1867
(1867) 11 Moore's Indian Appeals 551
A suit for restitution of conjugal rights lies in India under Muslim law, and a decree in such a suit is enforceable against the wife. The Privy Council also observed that Mohammedan law on the question of what constitutes legal cruelty between husband and wife would probably not differ materially from English law, which is the foundation of the rule that the standard of cruelty is religion neutral. Cruelty of such a character as to render it unsafe for the wife to return to her husband's dominion is a valid defence to such a suit.
muslim-lawrestitution-of-conjugal-rightscrueltyprivy-councilreligion-neutral-standardmixed-court-of-equity
Read case brief →Gauhati High Court (Division Bench)1981
(1981) 1 Gauhati Law Reports 375
The correct law of talaq as ordained by the Holy Quran is that talaq must be for a reasonable cause, and that it must be preceded by an attempt at reconciliation between the husband and wife by two arbiters, one chosen by the wife from her family and the other by the husband from his. If their attempts fail, talaq may be effected. Talaq should not be at the mere desire, sweet will, whim or caprice of the husband, and should not be secret. Jiauddin Ahmed correctly laid down the law, and the contrary Calcutta and Bombay decisions are not correct law.
muslim-lawtalaqreasonable-causereconciliationtwo-arbitersdivision-benchbaharul-islamgauhati
Read case brief →Supreme Court of India1981
(1981) 2 Supreme Court Cases 509; All India Reporter 1981 Supreme Court 1243; judgment of 18 February 1981
The expression divorced wife in the Explanation (b) to S.125(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is wide enough to cover a wife whose marriage has been dissolved on her own initiative, including by a decree under the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act 1939. Such a woman remains a wife for the purposes of S.125 and is entitled to maintenance.
muslim-lawmaintenancesection-125-crpcdivorced-wifedissolution-of-muslim-marriages-actmodes-of-dissolution
Read case brief →Judicial Commissioner's Court, Peshawar1940
All India Reporter 1940 Peshawar 2
For a valid Muslim marriage the proposal and acceptance must be made at one and the same meeting, by the parties or by persons on their behalf, and the agreement must be witnessed by two adult witnesses. Given the customary mode of solemnising marriages, the whole procedure must be affirmatively proved; a bare assertion by witnesses that they witnessed the nikah, without particulars, is insufficient. Where the girl has attained majority for marriage purposes her own consent is indispensable and cannot be supplied by a grandfather.
muslim-lawmarriagenikahproposal-and-acceptanceijab-qabulwitnessesproof-of-marriageconsent
Read case brief →Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (on appeal from Allahabad)1925
(1925) 52 Indian Appeals 145; All India Reporter 1925 Privy Council 63; judgment of 11 December 1924
A widow who is not a secured creditor but is in possession of her husband's estate with the consent of the heirs is entitled to retain possession until her dower debt is satisfied. The Board expressly declined to decide whether that right is a lien in the strict sense; whatever it is called, it rests on the power of a widow, as a creditor for dower, to hold property of her husband of which she has lawfully and without force or fraud obtained possession, until her debt is satisfied. It confers no title and places her on no higher footing than any other creditor.
muslim-lawdowermahrwidows-right-of-retentionlienno-titleprivy-council
Read case brief →Allahabad High Court (Full Bench)1888
(1888) Indian Law Reports 10 Allahabad 289 (Full Bench); judgment of 7 April 1888
Acknowledgment of parentage (ikrar) under Muhammadan law is a rule of substantive personal status and not merely a rule of evidence, so it falls within the personal law the courts must administer and is not displaced by the Evidence Act 1872. Where the fact or date of the marriage is neither proved nor disproved, a father's acknowledgment of a son establishes marriage and legitimacy for purposes of inheritance, provided legitimacy is possible. Acknowledgment cannot legitimise a child proved to be illegitimate.
muslim-lawacknowledgmentikrarpaternitylegitimacymahmood-jsubstantive-statusevidence-act
Read case brief →Supreme Court of India1969
AIR 1970 Supreme Court 446
In proceedings for maintenance under S.125 CrPC (now S.144 BNSS), the standard of proof is preponderance of probability, not proof beyond reasonable doubt. The wife need not prove neglect or refusal conclusively: a prima facie case suffices for the Magistrate to pass an order.
maintenanceS.144-BNSSstandard-of-proofwife-children-parentssem-5
Read case brief →Supreme Court of India1997
(1997) 6 Supreme Court Cases 233; All India Reporter 1997 Supreme Court 3280; judgment of 29 July 1997
Under both personal law and S.125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a Muslim father with sufficient means is under an absolute obligation to maintain his minor children who cannot maintain themselves, until they attain majority or are able to maintain themselves, whichever is earlier, and in the case of daughters until they marry. That obligation is unaffected by the divorced wife's custody of them. S.3(1)(b) of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act 1986 operates in a different field: the two year entitlement there is for the mother's own maintenance for nursing or caring for a child, and it does not touch the children's independent right.
muslim-lawmaintenancechildrensection-125-crpc1986-actsection-3-1-bindependent-rightbeneficial-construction
Read case brief →Supreme Court of India1984
AIR 1984 SC 1420
Domicile and residence requirements for educational admissions must be reasonable; the case is cited in family law for its discussion of domicile as a connecting factor and the distinction between domicile and mere residence.
domicileresidenceconnecting-factoreducational-admissionsconstitutional-law
Read case brief →Bombay High Court1997
AIR 1997 Bom 349
The pre-2001 S.10 of the Indian Divorce Act, requiring the wife to prove adultery coupled with another matrimonial offence while the husband could obtain dissolution on adultery alone, violated Art.14; there was no reasonable classification justifying the discrimination.
christian-lawdivorce-act-1869section-10discriminationarticle-14equality2001-amendment
Read case brief →Supreme Court of India1982
AIR 1982 SC 1261
Parliament is entitled to enact different grounds of divorce for different communities; the asymmetry in S.10 IDA was upheld at that time as having a rational basis rooted in the structure of Christian matrimonial law.
christian-lawdivorce-act-1869section-10article-14personal-lawlegislative-competence
Read case brief →Allahabad High Court2021
2021 SCC OnLine All 655
S.125 CrPC (now S.144 BNSS) is a secular remedy available to a Muslim wife irrespective of a pending personal law proceeding; the two are concurrent and there is no bar on cumulation.
muslim-lawmaintenancesection-125-crpcsection-144-bnsscumulationsecular-remedy
Read case brief →Supreme Court of India (five Judge Constitution Bench)1962
All India Reporter 1962 Supreme Court 853; (1962) Supplementary (2) Supreme Court Reports 496; judgment of 9 January 1962
On the faith and tenets of the Dawoodi Bohras, the exercise of the power of excommunication by the religious head on religious grounds forms part of the management of the community's affairs in matters of religion, so a statute invalidating even such excommunication infringes Art.26(b). Arts.25 and 26 protect not merely doctrines and beliefs but acts done in pursuance of religion, and what is an essential part of a religion is judged in the light of its doctrine and of what the community itself regards as part of its religion. The Art.26(b) right is not subject to the preservation of civil rights.
muslim-lawarticle-25article-26excommunicationdawoodi-bohrareligious-denominationessential-religious-practiceconstitution-bench
Read case brief →Supreme Court of India2002
(2002) 7 Supreme Court Cases 518; All India Reporter 2002 Supreme Court 3551; judgment of 1 October 2002
A talaq, to be effective, has to be pronounced, and the burden of proving the pronouncement lies on the husband. A talaq must be for reasonable cause and must be preceded by an attempt at reconciliation. A plea of previous divorce taken in a written statement cannot be treated as a pronouncement of talaq on the date of filing the written statement followed by delivery of a copy to the wife.
muslim-lawtalaqpronouncementproof-of-talaqreasonable-causereconciliationwritten-statementsection-125-crpc
Read case brief →Supreme Court of India (five Judge Constitution Bench)2017
(2017) 9 Supreme Court Cases 1; All India Reporter 2017 Supreme Court 4609; judgment of 22 August 2017
Talaq-e-biddat, instantaneous and irrevocable triple talaq, is set aside. Nariman and Lalit JJ held it manifestly arbitrary and violative of Art.14, and struck down S.2 of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act 1937 to the extent it recognised the practice, that section being law in force within Art.13(1). Kurian Joseph J held the practice contrary to the basic tenets of the Quran and therefore in violation of Shariat itself. Only two of the five Judges held the 1937 Act unconstitutional in part.
muslim-lawtriple-talaqtalaq-e-biddatarticle-14article-13article-25shariat-act-1937manifest-arbitrariness
Read case brief →Gauhati High Court1981
(1981) 1 Gauhati Law Reports 358
Although a Muslim marriage is a civil contract, a high degree of sanctity attaches to it and dissolution is recognised only in exceptional circumstances. Talaq must be for reasonable cause and must be preceded by attempts at reconciliation between the husband and the wife by two arbiters, one from the wife's family and the other from the husband's. Only if those attempts fail may talaq be effected. The attempt at reconciliation by two relatives, one from each side, is an essential condition precedent to talaq.
muslim-lawtalaqreasonable-causereconciliationtwo-arbitersbaharul-islamgauhatiproof-of-talaq
Read case brief →Supreme Court of India2023
2023 INSC 920
The Special Marriage Act as presently enacted is confined to marriages between a male and a female; legal recognition of same-sex marriages requires legislative action and cannot be read into the SMA by judicial interpretation.
special-marriage-actsame-sex-marriagequeer-rightslegislative-actionarticle-21article-14
Read case brief →Calcutta High Court1989
AIR 1989 Cal 1; 93 CWN 231; (1988) 2 DMC 343
Under the Indian Divorce Act, 1869, a decree of dissolution may be confirmed on proof of adultery coupled with cruelty (which alone would have justified judicial separation), or adultery coupled with desertion for two years or more; a bigamy allegation requires proof that a second marriage, valid at least in form, was actually performed -- mere proof of adultery with a named person, without proof of a marriage ceremony, does not establish bigamy.
indian-divorce-act-1869dissolution-of-marriageadulterycrueltydesertionbigamysection-17
Read case brief →Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (on appeal from Calcutta)1921
(1921) Law Reports 48 Indian Appeals 114; (1921) 23 Bombay Law Reporter 636; Indian Law Reports 48 Calcutta 856; judgment of 9 March 1921
Legitimacy is a status which results from certain facts; legitimation is a proceeding which creates a status that did not exist before. In the proper sense there is no legitimation under Muhammadan law. An acknowledgment is a declaration of legitimacy and not a legitimation. It has more than evidential value in that it raises a presumption of marriage and shifts the onus onto those denying the marriage, but the presumption is one of fact and not juris et de jure, and it is rebutted by affirmative proof that no marriage existed.
muslim-lawacknowledgmentlegitimacylegitimationpresumption-of-marriageprivy-councildunedinonus
Read case brief →Supreme Court of India1976
(1976) 4 Supreme Court Cases 780; All India Reporter 1976 Supreme Court 1569; (1976) 3 Supreme Court Reports 721; judgment of 22 March 1976
Four conditions must be satisfied for a valid dedication of a public nature: the founder must declare his intention to dedicate the property, no particular form being necessary and the declaration being capable of being presumed from express or implied conduct; the founder must divest himself completely of ownership, which may be inferred from delivery of possession; the property must be separated from the rest of his property with a way of access provided; and there must be delivery, which for a mosque means that people should pray there in jamaat, and where there is no express dedication prayers must have been offered with azan and ikamat. Where prayers have once been offered it is unnecessary to prove an express dedication, and dedication may also be inferred from long user as waqf property. Once a kabarstan is a public graveyard, non user does not change its character.
muslim-lawwaqfwaqf-by-usermosquegraveyardkabarstanazanikamat
Read case brief →Patna High Court (Division Bench)1932
All India Reporter 1932 Patna 33; 136 Indian Cases 417; judgment of 6 July 1931
A valid waqf requires a substantial dedication of the usufruct to charitable, religious or good purposes as understood in Muhammadan law. No particular form is necessary; a waqf may be inferred from royal grants in favour of individual persons so long as it was for a perpetual religious, charitable or good purpose; the dedicator need not use the word waqf nor formally transfer to God; and where there is a substantial dedication to a valid object the waqf is not vitiated because some non valid objects are also mentioned. Perpetuity is a necessary condition but need not be expressly stated, and where the named purpose is liable to failure the waqf remains valid and the property goes to the poor.
muslim-lawwaqfessentials-of-waqfperpetuityno-particular-formkhankahsajjadanashinsection-92-cpc
Read case brief →Supreme Court of India1964
All India Reporter 1964 Supreme Court 275; (1964) 4 Supreme Court Reports 549; judgment of 23 August 1963
The strict rule requiring delivery of possession to one of the four recognised guardians of a minor's property is not a condition of validity in two situations: a gift by a husband to his wife, and a gift to a minor who has no guardian of the property in existence. In such cases a gift accepted by the mother, or by another near relative or even a stranger having charge of the minor, is valid, provided there is a clear and manifest intention to make the gift and the donor divests himself of ownership and possession. Registration does not cure absence of delivery of possession.
muslim-lawgifthibaminor-doneeguardian-of-propertyconstructive-deliveryregistrationqiyas
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