Whirlpool Corporation v Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai
Rule established
The existence of an alternative statutory remedy is not an absolute bar to a petition under Article 226. The rule requiring its exhaustion is one of self-imposed restraint and discretion, and three exceptions are recognised: enforcement of a fundamental right, violation of natural justice, and want of jurisdiction or a challenge to vires.
Facts
- The dispute arose in proceedings relating to the registration of a trade mark, in which the petitioner was aggrieved by action taken by the registering authority.
- The governing statute provided a machinery for objections and appeals within the statutory scheme.
- Instead of pursuing that machinery, the petitioner moved the High Court under Art.226.
- The respondents raised a preliminary objection that the petition was not maintainable because an alternative statutory remedy existed and had not been exhausted.
- It was contended for the respondents that the availability of such a remedy deprived the High Court of jurisdiction, or at least obliged it to refuse relief in every case.
Issue
- Whether the existence of an alternative statutory remedy bars a petition under Art.226, and in what circumstances the High Court will entertain such a petition notwithstanding that remedy.
Held
- The objection was rejected. The Court held that the power under Art.226 is conferred by the Constitution in wide terms and is not taken away by a statutory remedy. The practice of requiring exhaustion of alternative remedies is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion, adopted by the courts themselves, and not a rule of law limiting jurisdiction. The Court identified three exceptions in which a petition will be entertained despite an alternative remedy: first, where the petitioner seeks enforcement of a fundamental right; second, where there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice; and third, where the order complained of, or the proceeding in which it was made, is wholly without jurisdiction, or where the vires of the statute itself is in question.
Ratio Decidendi
Article 226 is a constitutional power and a statute cannot cut it down; only the Constitution could do that. Since the requirement of exhausting other remedies is judge made, the courts remain free to depart from it where insistence on it would defeat the purpose of the jurisdiction. Each of the three exceptions reflects a case in which the statutory remedy is either inadequate or beside the point: a fundamental right calls for a constitutional remedy, a breach of natural justice vitiates the proceeding at its root, and a tribunal cannot pronounce on its own want of jurisdiction or on the validity of its parent Act.
How to use it in an exam
- The standard authority on the alternative remedy objection. Memorise the three exceptions, which are frequently asked as a list.
- The distinction to state precisely is between a rule of jurisdiction, which would bar the petition, and a rule of discretion, which does not.
- The third exception is the most useful in problem questions, because a tribunal cannot decide the vires of the statute that created it, so a challenge to vires must go to the High Court in any event.
- Read with L Chandra Kumar v Union of India 1997, which held that litigants must ordinarily approach the tribunal first as a court of first instance, while the High Court's writ jurisdiction remains available thereafter. The two are reconciled by treating L Chandra Kumar as the general rule and Whirlpool as supplying the exceptions.
- Note the other discretionary considerations that may still defeat a petition even where an exception applies: delay, the petitioner's own conduct, suppression of facts, and the existence of disputed questions of fact requiring evidence.
Source
Source: (1998) 8 SCC 1; AIR 1999 SC 22; the standard authority on the alternative remedy objection under Art.226; citation and bench checked against Indian Kanoon and reported sources, audit of 12 August 2026
This is an educational summary, not the judgment itself. Cite the reported version in professional or academic work.